It has long been suggested that the human body occupies a special place in both the adult and developing mind. There are a number of facets to this assumption. Human cognition is ''embodied'' in the sense that the experiences that inform our knowledge are constrained by the sensory and motor functions that the body makes ( Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Overton, 1994; Thelen, 1995b; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) . The human body is special because it, unlike any other object, is known from both the inside and from without, from first-and third-person perspectives. The body is not only a knowable object in its own right, but it also serves as a vehicle for conveying information about other individuals, including their transient mental states such as direction of attention and emotion, personal identity specified by an individual's characteristic body postures and movement patterns, and aspects of social identity such as gender, age and attractiveness. The human body is therefore highly complex and occupies a unique place in the world of knowable physical objects, and on that basis it has been suggested that the body is subject to dedicated cognitive representations and processes. Empirically, this assumption is supported by cognitive and neuropsychological studies, mainly with adult participants, that have shown that human body knowledge can be isolated from other domains of knowledge.
For the last century, investigators have noted that some types of brain damage can result in symptoms that implicate a disruption in some aspect of an individual's knowledge about the human body (see Denes, 1989; Goldenberg, 1997; Poeck & Orgass, 1971 for reviews). These sorts of syndromes came to be known as disorders of the ''body schema.'' However, the syndromes that were together classified as disorders of the body schema were highly variable with respect to the breadth and explicitness of knowledge about the body that was thought to be disturbed, for instance hemi-neglect, in which patients ignore one side of their bodies, and body part anomia, in which patients are incapable of correctly naming parts of the body, were both classified as body schema disturbances, despite their being defined by very different types of symptoms (perceptual-motor dysfunction on the one hand, and a form of aphasia on the other). As a number of authors have noted, the only thing that unifies these disorders is their having something to do with the body; the underlying representations and cognitive functions that are disturbed in these disparate ''disorders of the body schema'' may well be distinct (Denes, 1989; Poeck & Orgass, 1971; Reed, 2002) . The idea that the human body is subject to unique or dedicated mental representations is compelling, and so the term ''body schema'' has been adopted by a number of authors. Unfortunately there has been no consensus regarding a single definition for the term. The body schema has been conceptualized as anything from first person bodily awareness, to any kind of conceptual knowledge about the structure or functioning of human bodies in general. To further complicate matters, there is also a history of terminological inconsistency, with ''body schema'' and ''body image'' being used interchangeably by some authors, and other terms, including body percept, body template, body map, and somatopsyche also used to refer to knowledge about the body (Elian, Marcel, & Bermudez, 1995; Gallagher, 2004; Poeck & Orgass, 1971; Reed, 2002) .
LEVELS OF HUMAN BODY KNOWLEDGE: A COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Recently, a number of authors have sought to clarify the confusion by defining different levels of body knowledge (Sirigu, Grafman, Bressler, & Sunderland, 1991) . In this context, the term ''levels'' of body knowledge is used in recognition of the fact that human body knowledge is complex and multi-faceted, and is likely to be instantiated in more than one neural system. Theoretically, it is clear that human body knowledge includes a number of different levels, from direct sensori-motor knowledge of one's own body all the way up to factual knowledge about the human body as a biological organism. Empirically, distinctions among levels of human body knowledge are based on what is known about how the body is represented in the brain, and also on behavioral evidence from perceptual and cognitive tasks that reveal dissociations in aspects of body knowledge, often in individuals who have suffered brain damage. These perspectives reveal three distinct levels, types, or systems of human body knowledge in adults, distinguished by the durability of the underlying representations, their cognitive function, and accessibility to consciousness.
An important distinction in the literature on levels of human body knowledge is between short-term, sensori-motor representations of one's own body, versus long-term representations that support knowledge about bodies in general (including one's own). Recent neuropsychological studies have revealed that a number of interacting brain areas contribute to the representation of one's own body; these include sensory cortex, premotor and primary motor cortex and the parietal lobes (see Graziano & Botvinick, 2002 for a review). Some of these areas also contribute to the perception and interpretation of others' bodily motion (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Shiffrar & Pinto, 2002) . The consensus is that this level of human body knowledge is specifically short-term, dynamic and first-person, responsible for sensori-motor activity and basic awareness of one's own body (Goldenberg, 1997; Reed, 2002) , and not accessible to conscious reflection (Gallagher, 1995; 2004) . Evidence for the existence of this level of human body knowledge as distinct from other types of body knowledge comes from clinical syndromes that implicate specific deficits in aspects of one's own sensori-motor performance and/or awareness. These include hemi-neglect, in which patients do not register sensori-motor input or output for one half of their bodies, optic apraxia in which patients are unable to perform visually guided reaches, and phantom limbs, in which patients experience sensation in missing limbs. It is important to note that patients with these sensori-motor disorders typically do not realize that their body knowledge is erroneous; this supports the idea that this level of knowledge about the body is implicit (Gallagher, 2004) . As Gallagher, Butterworth, Lew, and Cole (1998) note, the existence of several cases of phantom limbs in children with congenital limb deletions suggests that at least some elements of this level of body representation are likely to be instantiated in built-in, species-specific neuro-motor circuitry.
In addition to sensori-motor representations of the body, we have all sorts of knowledge about bodies in general. This type of knowledge about the body is characterized by long-term representations that are accessible to conscious reflection (Gallagher, 1995; 2004; Reed, 2002) . Recent case studies of patients with parietal lobe brain damage indicate further that longterm representations of the human body comprise two distinct levels: a visuo-spatial level that specifies the topological features of the whole body, its parts and how they relate to each other in the whole, and a lexicalsemantic level that involves language-based knowledge about the body (Goldenberg, 1997; Sirigu et al., 1991) .
Evidence for distinct visuo-spatial representations of the human body derives from the clinical syndrome known as autotopagnosia. Patients with this disorder have a specific deficit in that they cannot find specific body parts when asked to point them out. When invited to ''point to your shoulder'', autotopagnosic patients fumble around, often pointing to a nearby body part (e.g., elbow instead of shoulder) and remarking that they can't find it, or ''it's around here somewhere'' (Ogden, 1985; Guariglia, Piccardi, Puglisi Allegra, & Traballesi, 2002; Semenza, 1988) . The deficit in body part localization applies whether the target part is on their own body, on another person's body or on representations of bodies including photographs, mannequins and dolls (but see Felician, Ceccaldi, Didic, Thinus-Blanc, & Poncet, 2003 for an autotopagnosic individual who showed a self-only body part localization deficit). The deficit also extends to other spatial tasks including matching identical body postures across different views (Denes, Cappelletti, Zilli, Dalla Porta, & Gallana, 2000) and verbally describing the location of body parts (Ogden, 1985; DeRenzi & Scotti, 1970; but see Guariglia et al., 2002) . Control tasks show that the autotopagnosic deficit in body part localization is specific to human bodies as the majority of patients can localize parts of other complex objects (bicycles) and in some cases, body parts of animals (Semenza, 1988; Guariglia et al., 2002; but see DeRenzi & Scotti, 1970) .
The majority of patients with autotopagnosia exhibit normal everyday behavior, indicating that their sensori-motor body representations are intact. These patients also tend to perform well on nonlocalization tasks indicating that lexical-semantic knowledge of the human body is intact. For instance, most autotopagnosic patients who fail to localize body parts can nevertheless name body parts when those parts are presented in pictures or touched on their own bodies (Buxbaum & Coslett, 2001; Ogden, 1985; Sirigu et al., 1991) ; they can name parts of clothing associated with specific body parts (sleeves, hats) in spite of failing to localize the related body parts (Ogden, 1985; Buxbaum & Coslett, 2001 ); and they can describe the functions of body parts (e.g., eyes are for seeing; Guariglia et al., 2002; Sirigu et al., 1991) . Further evidence for a dissociable level of lexical-semantic human body knowledge comes from case studies of a different clinical syndrome, body part anomia, in which patients exhibit specific problems with body part naming (Dennis, 1976; Coslett, Saffran, & Schwoebel, 2002) . The fact that these different syndromes exist independently, and usually result from brain damage in different (though often adjacent) locations in the left parietal lobe, suggests that the representations underlying visuo-spatial and lexical-semantic knowledge of the human body are at least partially independent. Patients with disorders that implicate disturbances in visuo-spatial or lexical-semantic body knowledge are often aware that their body knowledge is erroneous, indicating that these levels of knowledge, unlike the sensori-motor level, are accessible to consciousness. This brief review reveals three levels of partially-independent human body representations in adults: sensori-motor representations that are implicit and responsible for on-line bodily control and movement, visuospatial representations that contain general structural descriptions of the spatial attributes of the body and its parts, and lexical-semantic representations that entail propositional knowledge about the body including the names of parts and their functions, semantic associations, and so on. Now we turn to the investigation of when and how these levels of body knowledge emerge during development. Buxbaum and Coslett (2001) hint at a possible developmental trajectory when they propose that visuo-spatial and lexical-semantic body knowledge are derived from the more basic sensori-motor body knowledge. This idea is not new; classic authors also suggested that the motor/postural body representations evident in an infant's behavior could be foundational for later-developing body knowledge (see Piaget, 1953; Poeck & Orgass, 1971) . We return to this proposal in later chapters.
DEVELOPMENTAL LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
The foregoing review outlined three levels of human body knowledge derived from empirical work with adults. These partially independent levels of body knowledge are hypothesized to entail distinct ''levels'' of representation: sensori-motor, visuo-spatial, and lexical-semantic. In the remainder of this chapter, we review what is known about the early development of human body knowledge, and organize the review with respect to those three levels of body knowledge. In order to avoid historically confusing terminology (e.g., body schema, body image, etc.) we refer to these levels of body knowledge with terms that are descriptive of the nature of the underlying representations: sensori-motor body knowledge, visuo-spatial body knowledge, and lexical-semantic body knowledge. In line with this terminology, we adopt a minimal definition for representation as simply any type of ''stored knowledge' ' (Mandler, 1998) about the body within these three different levels. The ''levels'' of body knowledge outlined above are defined essentially by content (e.g., the type of stored knowledge about the body, and the behavioral and cognitive functions that knowledge allows). We acknowledge that these ''levels'' are not necessarily consistent with developmental perspectives on levels of knowledge. According to classic developmental theory (e.g., Piaget, 1953) , knowledge structures develop progressively through a series of levels, from sensori-motor action schemes, to mental representation, to symbolic representations (see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Müller, Sokol, & Overton, 1998 for updated versions of this perspective). Within the framework for human body knowledge derived from empirical and theoretical analyses of the structure of adults' body knowledge, each ''level'' of body knowledge (e.g., sensori-motor, visuo-spatial, lexical-semantic) may involve representations at different developmental levels of complexity. For instance, as we discuss below, some forms of neonatal behavior implicate sensori-motor body representations because they reflect stored knowledge about the body that allows for implicit, on-line bodily control; however, these behaviors do not necessarily imply representational knowledge at a more complex level than that of sensori-motor action schemes. In the following review we discuss evidence for developing body knowledge with respect to the three-level framework introduced above, and also attempt to clarify how the evidence relates to developmental levels of representation.
EVIDENCE FOR SENSORI-MOTOR BODY KNOWLEDGE IN INFANCY

Intermodal Coordination
Neonates have more control over their bodies than was once thought, and this capacity for simple bodily coordinations may constitute at least the beginnings of sensori-motor body knowledge. In particular, there is evidence that newborns coordinate inputs from their different senses, and control their motor behavior accordingly. Some examples of sensori-motor coordination are seen in the newborn reflexes: neonates will turn their heads in the direction of a sound and they will make defensive arm and head movements to remove a felt object from the face (Brazelton, Nugent, & Lester, 1987) . In addition to coordinated reflex behaviors, newborns also exhibit coordinated hand-to-mouth movements in which the mouth opens in anticipation of the hand's arrival (Butterworth & Hopkins, 1988) and object-driven pre-reaching gestures that reveal coordination of arm and hand movement with visual input (von Hofsten, 1982; Ronnqvist & von Hofsten, 1994) . These newborn skills indicate that sensory and motor systems are at least partially integrated at birth, and that type of basic bodily integration implicates the sensori-motor level of body knowledge, thought to be responsible for on-line bodily control. Such congenital coordinations do not necessarily implicate mental representations (but see Meltzoff & Borton, 1979; Meltzoff, Kuhl & Moore, 1991) ; instead they may simply exist as a function of built-in neuro-motor circuitry, and those inbuilt structures may be foundational for later development of sensori-motor representations.
A number of visual preference studies have specifically examined infants' knowledge of their own bodies by providing opportunities for kinaesthetic-visual matching. By three to five months of age, infants show coordination of their own felt and viewed movements reflected in the fact that they look reliably longer at video images of the moving legs of sameaged peers, compared with on-line images of their own legs (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Rochat & Morgan, 1995; Schmuckler, 1996) . This pattern of looking demonstrates a capacity not just to coordinate visual information and motor behavior, but also suggests that infants are integrating sensory and motor information from their own bodies into a coherent representation, in order to compare images of self and other. Some authors propose that this capacity to integrate different elements of one's own bodily experience is the foundation of a sense of self (Neisser, 1988; Rochat, 1995; Stern, 1985) . Rochat and Morgan (1995) found that 3-5-month-old infants discriminated video images that portrayed an incongruent view of their own legs (meaning that each leg image was reversed so that it appeared to move in
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the opposite direction to the felt direction of leg movement) from a congruent view, suggesting that infants not only match contingency information (I feel movement-I see movement) but that they match details of the felt and seen movement (I move right-I see rightward movement). Schmuckler (1996) replicated this pattern with infants viewing their own hands in congruent and incongruent views.
Morgan and Rochat (1997) further showed that 5-month-old infants visually discriminated images that portrayed their moving legs in a standard view, versus their legs in a reversed view whereby the left leg was shown to the right of midline and the right leg was shown to the left. When puffy leggings were put on the infants so that the features of their legs were obscured, infants no longer discriminated the two views. These authors argued that by five months of age, infants have some expectations about the appearance of their own bodies, namely expectations about the biomechanical features of their legs (see also Schmuckler & Fairhall, 2001 ). According to Rochat and colleagues, these findings indicate that infants have access to a representation of the invariant structure of their own bodies (that they term a ''body schema''; Rochat, 1998; Morgan & Rochat, 1997) . Thus within the first 6 months of life, sensori-motor body knowledge may develop from the simple bodily coordinations evident at birth, to involve more flexible, dynamic representations of the infant's own body.
Neonatal Imitation
The phenomenon of neonatal imitation, if real, can also suggest that infants possess sensori-motor representations of their own bodies, and further, it supports the idea that this level of body knowledge can also be recruited in the perception and interpretation of others' bodies. Meltzoff and Moore (1977 , 1983 , 1989 reported that newborns as young as several minutes old copied the gestures of adult models; these included mouth opening, tongue protrusion and lip protrusion. In one study, they also reported imitation of sequential finger movements by neonates (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) . This finding was initially controversial because it challenged long-held Piagetian beliefs about the cognitive capabilities of infants. The main issue was whether newborns have a capacity for mental representation: According to Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1983) , if newborns imitate facial gestures, that implicates a representational system that relates visually perceived motor movements to proprioceptively generated ones. This analysis of neonatal imitation continues to be controversial. Further controversy has arisen because of problems replicating the basic phenomenon.
Over the last two decades, numerous researchers have attempted replications of Meltzoff and Moore's findings. Some of these replications have been successful and have even extended the range of facial gestures that newborns will imitate (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Legerstee, 1991; see Meltzoff & Moore, 1997 for a review). However, other researchers have been unable to replicate the basic finding, and some have found that only a limited number of behaviors are imitated by newborns, perhaps reflexively (Abranvel & Sigafoos, 1984; see Anisfeld, 1991 see Anisfeld, , 1996 Jones, 1996) . There are also reports of neonatal ''imitation'' of nonhuman models ( Jacobson, 1979 , but see Legerstee, 1991 .
Even if newborns only imitate tongue protrusion (Anisfeld, 1996) , the phenomenon implicates some rudimentary sensori-motor body knowledge at the level of basic bodily coordination, like that discussed in the previous section. However, as Meltzoff and Moore have argued, if newborns are capable of flexibly imitating a range of different gestures, that implies that neonates have a capacity to map visual information about human body movement of another to proprioceptive information about body movement of the self. The hypothesis is that this mapping is achieved by a ''supramodal'' body representation that codes for bodily movement in general such that 'perceived other' is equivalent to 'felt own' (Meltzoff & Moore, 1995 , 1997 see also Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993) .
Recent work in the neurosciences provides some evidence for the existence of a gestural mirroring system in human adults, that could operate as a supramodal representational system like that hypothesized by Meltzoff and Moore. This system is thought to be similar to the individual ''mirror'' neurons recently discovered in the monkey premotor cortex, which fire both when actions are performed by the self and when the same actions are seen to be performed by others (Carey, 1996; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996) . In adult humans, brain imaging studies show that the same regions that are active when an individual performs specific motor movements also respond when another person is observed performing those movements (see Gallese et al., 2002 for a review). As mentioned above, this suggests that in adults, sensori-motor body representations participate in both performance and perception of bodily movement. A recent EEG study suggests that the same is true of preschool-aged children (Martineau & Cochin, 2003) . Whether the same is true in infancy requires further study. However, it is notable in this context that newborns only imitate if they see the dynamics of a gesture; just seeing the end state (e.g., a tongue poking out) is not sufficient to elicit imitation until late in the first year (Vinter, 1986) . Thus neonatal imitation may rely on dynamic, movement-based representations, characteristic of the sensori-motor level of body knowledge.
Infants' Responses to Human Movement
The previous section reviewed the evidence that sensori-motor representations of the body code for dynamic gestures, both performed and perceived. However, infants also demonstrate sensitivity to human movements that they are not yet fully capable of performing (Shiffrar & Pinto, 2002) . Evidence for this comes from infants' responses to ''point-light displays'' (PLDs) of human walkers. To create PLDs, actors are filmed walking around in the dark while wearing black suits with light-reflecting patches affixed to the major joints (e.g., wrist, elbows, etc.). The resulting films reveal a dozen or so luminous dots moving across a dark field, producing in adults a compelling percept of a coherent human figure in motion ( Johansson, 1973) . Research with adults has shown that observers can readily perceive complex features of such displays, including details of gait (marching vs. walking), specific actions (pushing vs. pulling), emotions (surprise vs. fear) and other features (see Shiffrar, 2001 and Thorton, Pinto, & Shiffrar, 1998 for reviews). Perception of human movement from PLDs is fast, effortless and independent of IQ, as demonstrated in studies with in various clinical groups (Moore, Hobson, & Anderson, 1995; Moore, Hobson, & Lee, 1997) .
To test whether infants perceive PLDs as portraying human movement, as adults do, researchers have simultaneously presented infants with PLDs of different movement patterns, and measured their looking preferences. Several studies using this methodology have shown that infants between the ages of three and six months look longer at a PLD walker compared to control displays, including incoherent displays generated by transposing the locations of the dots, inverting PLD walkers or presenting out-of-phase dot movement (Bertenthal, Proffitt, & Cutting, 1984; Bertenthal, Proffitt, Kramer, & Spetner, 1987; Fox & McDaniel, 1982) . In these studies, young infants preferred to look at the PLD displays that represented true human figures, walking upright. If sensori-motor body representations code for both perceived and executed actions, this leads to the question of how prewalking infants interpret these displays. Bertenthal (1993) found that when 3-, 5-and 7-month-olds were presented with a PLD walker and an out-ofphase pattern of dots, all infants preferred the PLD walker to the altered dots when they were presented upright, but only the 3-month-olds preferred the PLD walker when the displays were inverted. Thus after 3 months of age, infants showed a preference for human movement only if it was presented in the canonical, upright orientation. To explain this pattern of results, Bertenthal (1993) proposed that 3-month-old infants are sensitive to the relational qualities of human biomechanical motion inherent in both upright and inverted walker displays, without actually perceiving the upright walker as a human in motion. Older infants, in contrast, may perceive the upright PLD walker display as a familiar pattern, interpreting it in terms of ''stored knowledge about the human form'' (Bertenthal, 1993, p. 208) . This stored knowledge could be in the form of sensori-motor body representations, derived from infants' own motor experience, their perceptual experiences, or both. If the same body representations are relevant to action and perception (Gallese et al., 2002) , then the early motor experience of infants, which includes alternate leg kicking that is motorically identical to walking (Thelen, 1995b; Shiffrar & Pinto, 2002) , might contribute to sensori-motor representations that influence older infants' perception of PLD displays as moving human bodies.
In this section, we have reviewed evidence for sensori-motor body knowledge in infancy. This level of body knowledge is characterized by implicit, short-term representations that support on-line bodily movement and control. Thus sensori-motor body knowledge in infancy may include the intermodal coordinations evident in early infancy, as well as dynamic representations hypothesized to underlie neonatal imitation. Older infants' capacity for self/nonself discriminations and perception of PLD walkers provides further evidence for sensori-motor representations in infancy, and these may be involved in the perception of others' bodily movements as well as on-line control of one's own body. These representations presumably become increasingly complex and flexible as infants' motor control and skill develop, though according to the cognitive neuropsychological model, they remain implicit, dynamic and relatively short-term. Detailed studies of motor development support that hypothesis; at least in childhood, sensori-motor representations responsible for control and movement of one's own body are always constrained by the immediate organism-environment interaction (Adolph, 1997 (Adolph, , 2000 . Later in development, children acquire knowledge about their own motor skills, but this knowledge, both from the cognitive neuropsychological and developmental perspectives, would be instantiated not at the sensori-motor level, but rather in symbolic, lexical-semantic body representations.
EVIDENCE FOR VISUO-SPATIAL BODY KNOWLEDGE IN INFANCY
As noted above, in adults, sensori-motor human body knowledge may interact with, but is dissociable from, visuo-spatial and lexical-semantic body knowledge. Next, we review evidence for the visuo-spatial level of body knowledge in infancy. The question here is: when does a representation of the topological features of bodies in general, emerge in development?
Face Recognition
One of the first experimental studies with infants showed that infants prefer to look at human facial patterns compared to other patterns (Fantz, 1963) . This finding set off a wave of research investigating various aspects of face recognition in infancy. It is now well established that within the first few months of life, infants show a strong preference for stimuli that resemble human faces over comparably complex, high-contrast patterns (see Maurer, 1985 for a review). Further, even newborns show a preference for human facial stimuli, evidenced in their tendency to visually track faces ( Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991) . Studies investigating the source of infants' preference for faces have demonstrated that it is the specific configuration of faces that gets infants' attention: They prefer typical human faces in comparison with face patterns in which the constituent features have been scrambled, or a head shape with no internal features (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Johnson et al., 1991) . The method of comparing infants' responses to typical and scrambled faces controls for the possibility that infants are attracted to displays that contain the parts of faces (e.g., eyes, mouth, nose), without having a preference for how those parts are assembled. The fact that infants demonstrate preferences for typical, as opposed to scrambled, face patterns indicates that infants have very specific early expectations about the spatial properties of human faces.
Studies building on the finding that infants prefer faces show that infants learn rapidly about faces in the weeks after birth, enabling specific discriminations within the domain of faces. For instance, within the first several days of life, newborns prefer the individual faces of their mothers to those of strangers (Field, Cohen, Garcia, & Greenberg, 1984) . In terms of categorical discriminations, newborns can differentiate between happy, sad, and surprised facial expressions (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Nelson, 1987) and prefer adult-rated attractive to unattractive female faces (Langlois, Roggman, Casey, Ritter, Rieser-Danner, & Jenkins, 1987; Slater, Von der Schulenburg, Brown, Badenoch, Butterworth, Parsons, & Samuels, 1998) .
It is not entirely clear how infants pick out human faces as preferred visual stimuli. According to one model, the Conspec/Conlern model ( Johnson & Morton, 1991; Johnson, 1997) , infants are born with a template, or representation of the human face that directs early attention to, and drives the early preference for facial stimuli. According to this model, the inborn face template is a highly schematic facial pattern, consisting of three highcontrast blobs in a bounded region, spatially corresponding to the two eyes and mouth on a human face. Newborns preferentially track such three-blob stimuli, as well as more specified facial patterns (e.g., patterns containing detailed eyes, nose, and mouth). According to the Conspec model newborn tracking of facial stimuli is an innate, automatic behavior, driven by subcortical mechanisms, that biases infants' visual attention towards faces and thereby ensures that they learn about faces in early infancy. Within two months after birth, cortical processes (labeled Conlern in the model) are hypothesized to take over, overriding the innate preference for highly schematic faces, but building on the early learning and directing infants' attention to realistic human face stimuli. Thus the Conspec/Conlern model proposes that newborns pick out human faces by virtue of an innate, schematic representation of the human face that directs attention to human faces, and guides subsequent learning about faces, eventually giving way to higher-level (cortical) face processing.
An alternate, nonrepresentational account for newborns' face preferences is that the neonatal visual system is tuned to recognize, track, and fixate face-like patterns. According to this model, infants are born not with a schematic three-blob template that matches the human face, but with general perceptual biases to attend to and prefer any patterns, facial or nonfacial, that have relatively high contrast at the top of a bounded region (Turati, Simion, Milani, & Umilta, 2002; Valenza, Simion, Macchi Cassia, & Umilta, 1996) . This model proposes that the basis of infants' face preferences is a nonspecific perceptual bias, rather than an innate face template; however, in the newborn's natural environment, human faces are the most likely objects that conform to such a pattern, so a bounded region with high contrast on top may be functionally equivalent to an innate representation of a face. On either model, the earliest form of knowledge about human faces is highly schematic, becoming more detailed and specific with development. This implies that at least one element of visuo-spatial body knowledgeFknowledge about the faceFis present at birth, albeit in a highly schematic form.
Is the face somehow special, or does the early face preference imply that infants also have visuo-spatial knowledge about the rest of the human form? It has been suggested that the face is indeed a 'special' visual object, handled by unique and dedicated object recognition mechanisms in the brain (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; but see Tanaka & Gauthier, 1997). The issue of whether the body is a similarly 'special' object is open to debate (see Slaughter, Stone, & Reed, in press). It is worth noting here that autotopagnosics tested on face recognition show some deficits in the visual processing of faces; when presented with a face puzzle and asked to put the internal parts in the correct configuration, autotopagnosic patients failed by making mistakes like exchanging eyes for ears, and inverting the mouth (Guariglia et al., 2002; Ogden, 1985) . These data support the idea that the face is part of the overall body representation, such that localized brain damage can cause concurrent disruption of face and body visuo-spatial processing. However, it should also be noted that autotopagnosics typically do not suffer prosopagnosia, the inability to recognize individual faces, which indicates that some aspects of their face processing are intact, and further indicates some dissociation in face and body visual representations. We return to this issue of similarities and differences in the recognition of face and body configurations below.
Categorization of Humans
Categorization studies aimed at investigating infants' ability to discriminate humans from other complex stimuli provide indirect information about infants' human body knowledge. As these studies present pictures and toy models to infants, they test infants' responses to the structural layout of the human body, and therefore tap visuo-spatial human body knowledge.
Quinn and Eimas (1998; Quinn, 2002) investigated young infants' categorization of pictures of humans and nonhuman mammals. They familiarized 3-4-month old infants with pictures of adults (presented in pairs), in which each picture displayed a different person, in a different position, wearing different clothes. In a second condition, the infants were similarly familiarized to pictures of various animals. During the test-phase, infants saw new pairs of pictures showing one previously unseen exemplar of the familiar category, paired with a new exemplar of a contrasting category, taken from both the animate and inanimate domains. When infants were familiarized with humans, they showed no preference for any of the out-ofcategory exemplars from the animate domain (cat, dog, horse). Such a preference only occurred for an inanimate object (e.g., a car). However, when pictures of either horses or cats were used for familiarization, infants preferred to look at the exemplar of a contrasting category, whether it was a different animal, a human, or a car. This pattern of results indicates that different processes underlie infants' categorization of humans and other animals.
To explain this asymmetry in categorization of humans versus animals, Quinn and Eimas (1998) suggest that infants' knowledge of human beings is both richer and broader than that of other animals, and this affects their categorizations. Because infants are likely to have experience with a number of individual humans, but relatively few animals, they suggest that in the first few months of life infants rapidly become ''experts'' at categorizing humans. Infants may come into the experimental procedure with experience of humans that includes familiarity with many specific exemplars (individual humans) as well as a summary representation, or prototype derived from that experience. This prototype would be an established representation of humans that includes visuo-spatial information about the human body. In contrast to their rich history of experience of humans, Quinn and Eimas argue that young infants are likely to have relatively limited experience with animals, and therefore are unlikely to come into the experimental procedure with established knowledge about animals. Thus when presented with an animal picture following familiarization with humans, infants may perceive the animal as being similar to the human prototype (primed in the familiarization phase), and therefore treat the animal as a member of the human category. Thus the early asymmetry in categorization of humans versus animals is explained in terms of differential experience with the categories.
Quinn and Eimas suggest that infants' willingness to accept animals into the category of human beings indicates that developmentally, humans serve as a cognitive ''reference point'' for categorization of animals in general. They further propose that the human body structure of a prominent face/ head and an elongated body with appendages is the basis for infants' perception of similarity between animals and humans, and this body structure may provide a basic template for animals in general, with humans as the ''best'' example of the category. In Quinn and Eimas' view (1998) , this template is a schematic mental representation of the structure of the human body, reminiscent of the proposed schematic quality of infants' early knowledge of the face.
To directly explore the importance of body shape in the categorization of humans and animals, Quinn (2002) tested 3-and 4-month-old infants' categorization of humans and animals by contrasting conditions in which the stimuli were pictures of heads only, bodies only, and whole bodies. Quinn (2002) replicated the asymmetry in infants' categorization of humans versus cats, only if whole-body information was presented; it was not enough to show human heads or bodies alone. Thus infants included cats in their human category only if the humans were presented from head to toe. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the pattern obtained when animals alone were presented for categorization; cats and dogs were successfully categorized by young infants on the basis of head information alone (Quinn & Eimas, 1996) .
Pauen (2000) ran a similar study exploring infants' categorization of humans versus animals and found that by seven months of age, infants dishabituated to an animal following familiarization with humans. Comparing this finding with Quinn and Eimas (1998) suggests the conclusion that infants' categorization of at least some animals diverges from the hypothesized human ''reference point'' by the age of 7 months. Pauen (2000) also concluded that humans are represented as a category distinct from other mammals by 7 months of age. According to Quinn and Eimas' developmental model, this change may reflects infants' increasing familiarity with animals, leading to summary representations of animals that help infants identify them as being dissimilar to humans.
Other methods that have been used to explore infants' categorization of humans reveal later developmental trends. For instance, Ross (1980) found evidence for categorization of humans and animals only at 12 months with an object examination task, in which infants were allowed to handle and examine three-dimensional models depicting members of one ontological category (e.g., humans, animals, vehicles), and then they were presented with an exemplar from a contrasting category. Recovery of interest, or extended examination of the contrasting exemplar, is taken as evidence for categorization in this paradigm. Pauen (2000) replicated Ross's study with younger infants, and established that 7-, 9-, and 11-month-old infants distinguished humans from mammals with this methodology. Oakes, Plumert, Lasink, and Merryman (1996) conducted two experiments comparing 10-and 13-month-old infants' discrimination of humans versus animals in object-examination and sequential-touching tasks. Using an object-examination task, both age groups distinguished between animals and humans. When infants were tested using a sequential touching task (requiring sequential handling of items from a single category) only 13-month-old infants distinguished between the two categories. These results highlight a point made by Oakes and colleagues (1996) and others (Mareschal & Quinn, 2001; Ross, 1980; Younger & Furrer, 2003) , namely, that conclusions about infants' categorization abilities cannot necessarily be made independently of the methodology employed, the response measured, the categories presented, and the input history in a given experimental paradigm.
Mandler (1997, 2000) has argued that visual and manual tasks tap two distinct categorization processes in infancy. Mandler proposes that visual tasks reflect perceptual categorization processes that are based on surface properties like shape and texture. Manual tasks on the other hand reflect conceptual categorization processes that are based on relatively more complex object properties such as movement, behavior and agent-patient relationship roles. If correct, this would suggest that something more than visuo-spatial categorization of the human form is necessary for infants to discriminate humans from animals on the manual tasks described above. We address this controversial proposal (see Quinn & Eimas, 2000; Quinn, Johnson, Mareschal, Rakison, & Younger, 2000 , for discussions) in the studies reported below by comparing infants' performance across visual and manual human body categorization tasks.
In sum, the infant categorization work indicates that by four months of age infants discriminate humans from other animals (but not vice versa) on the basis of body shape. Exhaustive categorization of humans versus animals has been demonstrated in different categorization paradigms by around the end of the first year of life. Quinn and Eimas (1996) suggest that the early discrimination of humans from animals is based on knowledge about the typical human form, schematically represented by facial attributes and an elongated body with appendages. If this is the case, when does that early, schematic knowledge of the human form develop into the detailed visuospatial body knowledge evident in adults?
Infants' Preferences for Typical Versus Scrambled Human Body Pictures
We earlier tested the question of when infants acquire detailed visuospatial human body knowledge by exploring when infants discriminated typical human body shapes from atypical or scrambled human body shapes (Slaughter, Heron, & Sim, 2002) . Following the logic of the face recognition research, we created scrambled human body pictures that were equated with typical body pictures for amount of contour and contrast, but violated the canonical human body structure. The six typical body pictures showed a human standing in a variety of postures, and the six scrambled body pictures showed violations of the typical human body shape, constructed by moving the limbs to noncanonical locations on the body (see Figure 1 ). Bodies were scrambled according to the following logic: the head, torso, arms, and legs were identified as basic-level body parts ( Johnson & Kendrick, 1984) whose names are learned relatively early (Witt, Cermack, & Coster, 1990 ; see discussion below), so these were the units that were manipulated to create scrambled bodies. Scrambling involved moving the arms and legs to noncannonical locations while maintaining symmetry of the overall pattern (because infants are sensitive to changes in symmetry alone; Bornstein & Krinsky, 1985) . The head remained at the top of the scrambled body patterns because we wanted to assess infants' specific knowledge about the structure of the human body and pilot work suggested that bodies with heads moved from the top are confusing with respect to whether they are human at all.
A design comparing infants' responses to typical and scrambled bodies was chosen for two reasons: (a) because such a design controls for the possibility that infants may be interested in looking at displays that contain the parts of bodies (e.g., arms, legs, torso, head), without having a preference for how those parts are assembled, and (b) to allow for comparison with the body of literature on infants' responses to typical and scrambled faces.
Infants at 12, 15, and 18 months of age were presented with pairs of human body line drawings, one typical and one scrambled body per trial, for a total of six trials. Typical and scrambled schematic face stimuli were also presented, paired on a single looking trial. The results of this study revealed that 18-month-olds had a reliable looking preference for the scrambled body shapes over typical body shapes, but no preference for either type of face pattern. The younger infants, in contrast, did not show differential responding to the body stimuli, but showed reliable preferences at 12 and 15 months for the typical face over the scrambled face. This clear dissociation in infants' responses to human face and body stimuli indicated that infants' learning about human faces and human bodies follow different developmental trajectories.
The results also supported the idea that detailed visuo-spatial knowledge of the human body develops relatively late in infancy; however, further research is necessary because the lack of a visual preference in younger infants is ambiguous. One interpretation is that the 12-and 15-month-olds showed no preference for typical or scrambled body shapes because they did not visually discriminate the two types of body shapes. An alternative interpretation, however, is that younger infants are capable of distinguishing between typical and scrambled body shapes, but they did not have an inherent preference for one type of body shape over the other. Thus the failure to exhibit a preference for typical or scrambled bodies in infants younger than 18 months is inconclusive, and further studies are required to establish when and how detailed visuo-spatial body knowledge emerges in development. We report a series of studies that addresses this question in the following two chapters.
Body Part Localization by Toddlers
In the neuropsychological literature discussed above, researchers make a distinction between body part localization tasks, in which participants are requested to point out a named body part, and body part naming tasks, in which participants are requested to provide a lexical label for a body part. Both tasks require some lexical-semantic knowledge, but the body part localization tasks are thought to specifically assess visuo-spatial body knowledge because in order to find a named body part, participants must have an intact topographical representation of where specific body parts are located in relation to the whole body.
Developmentally, these two tasks are not so easily separated because toddlers learn body parts by pointing and naming. Successful body part localization therefore depends on some level of developed lexical-semantic body knowledge. In the few developmental studies on this topic, the two tasks are often conflated and referred to as ''body part identification,'' but since this review of literature adheres to the three-level model of human body knowledge, we discuss the development of body part localization and body part naming skills separately. Note that the interdependence of these skills indicates that these tasks involve developmentally more advanced human body knowledge at a symbolic representational level, compared to the visual discrimination tasks discussed in the previous sections.
The capacity to accurately point to body parts develops rapidly between the ages of 12 months and 4 years. The developmental sequence is fairly regular across children, such that several standardized developmental tests include some body part localization items (e.g., Bayley, 1969) . Witt et al. (1990) undertook a detailed developmental study of body part identification in 11-25-month-olds by asking toddlers to point out 20 different body parts on a doll. Results indicated that only a minority of 12-month-olds accurately localized any body parts and those parts found first were parts of the face: eyes, hair, nose, and mouth. The first nonfacial body parts to be accurately localized were arm, hand, finger, legs, foot, toes and tummy, by a minority of toddlers at 15 months of age. Localization ability steadily increased after that such that by 24 months of age, 90% of toddlers were able to point to 11 or more body parts. At that age, the best performance was still on facial parts, with over 95% of the 24-month-olds capable of accurately pointing to eyes, hair, nose, and mouth.
Twenty-four-month-olds' ability to point to body parts on a doll and on themselves was also compared, revealing no difference between the two skills (Witt et al., 1990) . Identical performance in body part naming across real humans and representations of humans is also seen in adult autotopagnosics, who typically perform identically on localization tasks involving real bodies or representations of bodies (but see Felician et al., 2003, discussed below) . This equivalence of performance across real bodies and representations of bodies suggests the presence of a single visuo-spatial representation for all human bodies, including one's own, another's, body pictures and models. We return to this issue in the following chapters, with specific reference to infants' responses to different types of human body representations.
Toddlers' and Young Children's Human Figure Drawings
When toddlers begin to generate external representations in the second and third year of life, a common topic in their drawings is the human body, often one of the first images to be produced. These initial representations of humans are highly predictable both in terms of structure and development (Cox, 1993; Harris, 1963 ). An enduring question in this literature is whether children's human figure drawings reflect their human body knowledge, that is, are the drawings made with reference to a visuospatial body representation?
Around age two and a half, children first begin to draw ''tadpole'' people. These human figure drawings typically depict a head at the top of the figure, often with two dot eyes and a line mouth, and two legs descending from the head. Tadpole drawings continue to around age four, with some elaboration; arms may be added, usually extending from the sides of the head, and features like ears or hair may be added to the head. The basic shape of the tadpole figure, however, remains simple: a head with symmetrical extensions below (Cox, 1993) . After age four or so, children's drawings of the human figure become more detailed and most notably a torso is included. In a ''transitional'' figure, the torso is drawn with legs attached, but the arms are still portrayed as extending from the sides of the head. Finally, ''conventional'' human figure drawings include a torso from which the head and all four limbs extend. It is interesting to note that young children's human figure drawings in the early stages are almost invariably presented standing upright and facing forward; it is not until after age seven or so that children begin to depict humans in sitting postures, in movement, or in profile (Cox, 1993; Cox & Lambon, 1996) .
As noted above, there is an ongoing debate about whether children's human figure drawings accurately reflect their knowledge of the human body. If children draw tadpole figures based on an internal representation, that suggests that toddlers' visuo-spatial knowledge of the human body is minimal, including only a head and some limbs below. Note that this is in line with Quinn and Eimas' (1998) proposal about the structure of infants' earliest representation of humans. Brittain and Chien's (1983) data are relevant here; these authors compared performance on human body drawing and body part localization tasks by asking toddlers who routinely drew tadpole figures to point to body parts on a pre-drawn detailed human figure. Tadpole drawers were able to identify hands, bellies, knees, etc., on those drawings even though they did not depict them in their own drawings. This suggests that toddlers' visuo-spatial body knowledge as required for localization tasks is more detailed than their drawings admit. Similarly, when tadpole drawers were given body parts to assemble in a paper-doll construction task, they made a conventional figure (e.g., one with head, arms, torso, legs) if the body parts in the construction task were accurately shaped and detailed (Cox, 1993) . Again, these results suggest that toddlers have more detailed mental representations of the human figure than they are capable of depicting in their drawings. However, in a selection task in which children were asked to draw a human and then choose the best human from a range of tadpole, transitional and conventional human figure drawings, tadpole drawers chose tadpole figures over conventional figures as being the best picture of a person (Cox, 1993) . Furthermore, individual children sometimes produce complex drawings that include several levels of human figure drawings, from tadpoles to conventional figures (Cox, 1993) .
Given these data, the proposal that toddlers draw tadpole figures because they possess only a minimal or incomplete body representation seems unlikely; however, tadpole drawers only produce more complex human figures when they are prompted to do so via specific task demands. One interpretation is that the basic visuo-spatial body representation of toddlers is highly schematic like their tadpole drawings, but they also have access to more detailed information about the human figure. An alternate proposal is that children draw tadpoles solely because of performance constraints on drawing. On this view tadpole drawers have detailed body representations, but they are unable to plan and execute the drawing that would accurately depict their knowledge (Freeman, 1987) . Cox (1993) similarly suggests that tadpole drawers have complete internal models, but suggests that children do not know how to pictorially depict all they know about the human figure. She argues that children's graphic human body representations reflect the relative salience of particular body parts, with head and legs being most important in the tadpole drawing stage. The idea that young children's body knowledge is hierarchically organized is consistent with the body part localization data, in which parts of the head and limbs were learned earlier than parts of the torso. Further, this hierarchy of body part salience also comes through in the development of lexical-semantic body knowledge, discussed below.
In this section, we have reviewed evidence for the development of visuo-spatial body knowledge in infancy and toddlerhood. This level of human body knowledge, like the sensori-motor level, involves different developmental levels of representation. The first evidence for visuo-spatial body knowledge comes from infants' early categorization of humans and animals; it was suggested that infants' performance on such tasks implicates the presence of an initial, schematic representation of the human body in the first six months of life (Quinn & Eimas, 1998) . In the second year of life, infants discriminate typical from scrambled human bodies, indicating the likely presence of a detailed visuo-spatial human body representation that specifies how body parts relate to each other in the whole. Soon after that, toddlers begin to perform body part localization, which implicates both visuo-spatial body knowledge and the beginnings of lexical-semantic knowledge about the body. At yet another level, toddlers may demonstrate this level of human body knowledge through the production of human body drawings, which involve symbolic processing of visuo-spatial body representations.
EMERGENCE OF LEXICAL-SEMANTIC HUMAN BODY REPRESENTATIONS
Toddlers' Identification of Body Parts
Verbal knowledge about the structure of the human body emerges in the second year of life. Developmentally, this presents fairly clear cut evidence that the toddler is operating at a level of symbolic representation. The ability to name body parts develops rapidly between the ages of one and two years (Gesell, 1940) and shows an emergence hierarchy. Names for head and facial features are typically the first parts to be learned, followed by names for arms and legs and fingers and toes. Note that this developmental progression is perfectly consonant with the development of body part localization, reviewed above, perhaps not surprisingly because, as noted, toddlers' learning about body parts involves simultaneous learning of body part locations and names. Names for joints (e.g., wrist, elbow, knee) are learned later, as are terms that encompass a number of parts (e.g., body) and terms that refer to parts of parts (e.g., eyelash; Andersen, 1978; Witt, et al., 1990) . Body part recall studies also reflect hierarchically organized lexical-semantic body part knowledge, as children are most likely to name parts of the head and face, and the feet, when asked to free recall parts of the body (Crowe & Prescott, 2003; Johnson, Perlmutter, & Trabasso, 1979) .
The Acquisition of Knowledge About Human Body Function
Coincident with learning the names of body parts, toddlers start learning about the functions of some body parts as well. Functions of highly salient and visible parts, such as the sensory organs of the face, and the hands and feet, which all have easily identifiable and unique functions, are learned earlier than functions of other parts (Gellert, 1962; Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002) . There is a large and growing literature on the development of knowledge about the human body as a biological entity; this literature indicates that functional knowledge of some internal body parts is acquired in the preschool and early school years, and becomes elaborated as children construct a naive biological framework and as they participate in formal learning about the biology of the human body ( Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; see chapters in Siegal & Peterson, 1999) . As any medical practitioner will attest, the acquisition of lexical-semantic knowledge about the human body is a lifelong developmental process.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This review of evidence for development of levels of human body knowledge in infancy and early childhood indicates that sensori-motor knowledge of the human body may originate in congenital intermodal coordinations, and those may form the basis for later-developing sensorimotor representations of the body. Visuo-spatial body knowledge is also evidenced at different developmental levels of complexity, from simple perceptual discriminations of humans versus animals, to discrimination of typical versus scrambled human bodies, to body part localization and finally human figure drawings. Last to develop appears to be lexical-semantic body knowledge, not surprisingly as this level relies solely on symbolic (language-based) representations.
In the remainder of this Monograph, we explore in more detail the development of visuo-spatial body representations. In the next two chapters, we report a series of studies that further investigate some of the issues that have been raised in the foregoing review, namely: At what age does detailed visuo-spatial knowledge of the human body emerge? What is the developmental trajectory for this level of human body knowledge? How is this level of knowledge of the body related to the well-documented phenomenon of precocious face recognition in infancy?
At the same time, we also consider theoretical accounts of how the three levels of human body representation may be related in development. As reviewed above, the three levels of human body knowledge we have reviewed are dissociable, both in adults as evidenced by neuroimaging and studies of patients with brain damage, and in infants (e.g., young infants possess sensori-motor knowledge but obviously lack lexical-semantic knowledge; this is generally true not only with respect to human body knowledge but in other content domains as well; Piaget, 1962; Müller & Overton, 1998) . The neuropsychological evidence indicates that human body knowledge is widely distributed but also may occupy adjacent brain regions in the parietal lobe, suggesting that different levels of human body knowledge may be functionally related. We consider this possibility with respect to the developmental data in the final chapter. 
